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BENCH MEMO 
No. 70-314 OT 1971 
Brunette Machine Works, Ltd v. Kockum Industries 
Cert to CA 9 (Duniway, Carter, Gray--Per Curiam) 
QUESTION PRESENTED: 
Whether, in a patent infringement suit against an alien, .,. -..., __________ _ 
fh G " venue is governed by patent-infringement-venue stat~te or by ----- ..... ,. -
the alien-venue statute. 
FACTS 
Resp, Kockum Industries, filed a patent infringement 
suit in the USDC D Oregon against Petr, Brunette Machine 
Works, a corporation licensed in Canada. Petr moved to 
dismiss the suit for improper venue, claiming that a patent 
infringement suit could only be brought in a district in which 
the defendant resides or where it committed acts of infringe-
ment and has a regular and established place of business. 
RELEVANT CASES: In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653 (1893); Stonite 
Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co, 315 U.S. 561 (1942); 
Fourco Glass Co v. Transmirra Prod., 353 U.S. 
222 (1957); Coulter Electronics Inc •• v A.B, 






The DC agreed and granted the motion to dismiss. Resp appealed 
to the CA 9 and that court reversed the DC, holding that venue --was proper in the district for Oregon under the alien-venue 
statute which states that an alien may be sued in any district. 
The alien corporation filed cert • 
DISCUSSION: 
It may be helpful to set out the two competing statutes. 
28 U.S.C. § 139l(d): ~ 
"An alien may be sued in any district." ~ ~ /1/ ~ 
. ,.:~tv 28 u.s.c. § 1400(b): kl~-
"Any civil action for p~nt infringement may be brought 
in the judicial distric 
I 
here the defendant resides, or 
~here the defendant has committed acts of infringement 
and has a regular and established place of business." -
Cert was granted in this case to resolve a conflict in 
the Circuits. The CA 9 and every other federal court, save one, 
has held that an alien patent infringer may be sued in any 
district where personal service may be effected. The CA 7 
has held to the contrary in a 1967 case in which this Court 
denied cert. Cert was further called for since the CA7 
case relied on broad language from several Supreme Court 
cases which would seem to support the CA7 view. A brief 
excursion, chronologically, through the history of the devel-
opment of these patent and alien venue provisions will demon-
strate, I believe, the soundness of the CA 9's view. 
In 1893 this Court decided In re Hohorst, supra. This was 
389 U.S. 859; Phizer v. Laboratori Pro-Ter, 





a patent infringement suit against an alien. At the time the 
case came up there was neither an alien venue statute nor a 
patent infringement venue statute. The general venue statute 
in existence at the time permitted suit only in the district 
re:,udei. 
in which the defendant was inhabiteg;. The Court held that 
the general statute could not apply against an alien since 
µits 
he had no district of inhabitance. SIHill against aliens could 
be had "in any district in which valid service can be made -upon the defendant." The Court stated: 
"The words of that provision, as it now stands 
upon the statute book, are that 'no civil suit shall be 
brought before either of said courts against any person 
by any original process or proceeding in any other 
district than that whereof he is an inhabitant.' These 
words evidently look to those persons, and those persons 
only, who are inhabitants of some district within the 
United States. Their object is to distribute among 
the particular districts the general jurisidction 
fully and clearly and clearly granted in the earlier part 
of the same statute; and not to wholly annul or defeat 
that jurisdiction over any comprehended in the grant. 
To construe the provision as applicable to all suits 
between a citizen and an alien would leave the courts of 
the United States open to aliens against citizens, 
and close them to citizens against aliens. Such a 
construction is not required by the language of the pro-
vision, and would be inconsistent with the general 
intent of the section as a whole." P.660. 
Having already held that the statute did not apply to 
suits against aliens, the Court went on to note that patent 
infringement suits present a peculiarly compelling case for 
liberal construction of the venue laws since such cases are, 
by statute, reserved for the exclusive jurisdiction of the 








there is no judicial forum at all for a suit against a 
patent infringer. 
Four years later the first patent venue statute 
was passed (1897). The statute, although its language was 
a little more cumbersome, was identical in result to the 
present statute--it allowed suits to be brought where the 
infringer resided or where he had committed acts of infringe-
ment and maintained a regiular place of business. 
The first major conflict between the patent venue statute 
and 11:he general venue statute was presented in Stonite Prods. 
'3' ~ f).. ~ (t.J 
v. Melvin Lloyd Co., supra, in which the conflict was with a 
section stating that suits against 2 or more defendants, 
residing in different districts in the same st~te, could be 
brought in either district. A patent infringement suit 
had been filed against two domestic corporations residing 
in 2 districts. Suit was brought in one of the districts; 
the defendant residing in the other jurisdiction complained 
that venue was not proper as to it. The Court held that 
the patent venue statute was the "exclusive provision con-
trolling venue in patent infringement proceedings." The 
Court said that the 1897 statute was designed to resolve the 
confusion, which existed after in re Hohorst, as to where 
patent infringement suits might be brought: That section 
was not be read as a venue section to be applied compatibly 
with the general venue provisions but was designed to be the I ------..._ ___ _ 
ex;lusiv~~ venue in infringement~uits. (The action 
invloved only domestic infringers and no mention at all was 






Stonite was decided in 1942. In 1948 the patent venue 
statute was recodified and the question quickly arose whether 
the recodification had effected any substantive changes in 
the intendment of the law. In Fourco Glass Co v. Trasnmirra 
Prod Co., supra, the question was firmly resolved in the 
negative. This was a patent infringement suit against a 
domestic corporate infringer. The precise question was 
whether the general corporate venue statute could be applied 
in a patent infringement suit. The general venue provision 
stated that a corporation could be sued in any district in 
which it was doing business. A suit was brought where a domestic 
corporation was doing business but in which he had not committed 
acts of infringement. To comply with the patent venue statute 
the defendant must both do business and have committed acts 
-if 
of infringement in the district. The Court held, tha1unless 
tthe revision had altered the substance of the statute, the 
patent provision was the exclusive controlling venue statute. 
The Court looked to the "Reviser's note" and concluded that 
Congress did not intend section 139l(c) to be an exception 
to section 1400(b). As in Stonite, the opinion contains broad 
language indicating that the patent infringement proviso is 
the exclusive source of venue in all patent cases. Again, 
however, the alien provision was not involved in the case. 
I In 1967, the CA7 was presented with the precise question involved in the instant case. In Coulter Electronics Inc v. 
A.B. Lars, supra, the CA held that a patent infringement 
suit against an alien corporation could only be brought 
in the districts prescribed in the patent venue statute. 





Fourco to the effect that the exclusivity of section 1400(b) 
was well established. The CA noted that the opposing view 
was based, in part, on the contention that In re Hohorst 
was still good law. But, the CA found, Hohorst lost its 
viability in 1897 when the patent venue statute was passed. 
This, the ct thought, was the teaching of Stonite. The Court 
thought that to rule otherwise would constitute "judicial legis-
lation" and that, if there were hardships created by its interp-
retation of the law then it was up to Congress to amend the 
J 
statute. This Court denied cert in the case. 
The same day that cert was denied in Coulter, the SDNY 
(per Judge Mansfie~) decided Phizer Co. v. Laboratori Pro-fer, 
which was also a case involving a patent infringement suit 
against an alien corporate entity. Judge Mansfie~d first 
looked at Coulter and said that he was unable to follow the 
decision in that case. He then looked to the precedents which 
e CA 7 had found controlling--Stonite & Fourco--and decided 
~~ /that, while their language was broad, neither had direct 
s~ I applicability to the instant case since both involved suits 
4- ~~\against domestic corporations. The judge noted that Fourco 
6,,;' ~rested primarily on a review of the reviser's note to the 
J recodification of the patent statute. He pointed out that 
• 
the CA 7 had overlooked a critical revise1r note to section 
139l(d), which indicated that, unlike section 139l(c), the 
alien section was to operate as an exception to the patent 
venue statute. Quoted in full the critical note states: 
"Subsection (d) of this section is added to give 
statutory recognition to the weight of authority con-
cerning a rule of venue as to which there has been 
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• I , 
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Machine Co v. De Lavand, 1918, D.C.Ohio, 251 F. 631, 
632 (sic) and cases cited. See also Keating v. Pennsyl-
vania Co., 1917, D.C.Ohio, 245 F. 155 and cases cited.)" 
Sandusky Foundry. the ct noted, was a patent infringement 
suit against an alien in which the court held that the patent 
venue provision did not exclude the operation of the general 
rule allowing the institution of suits against aliens in any 
district where they might be served. As authority for that 
~ 
proposition, the Sandusky cited, among other precedents, 
i1 
Hohorst and Keating (the other precedent cited in the Reviser's 
Note). 
(..(/,_,,J-
The Phizer also noted the injustice of reading the 
A 
patent-'.X'enue provision as exclusive: 
"the effect of holding section 1400(b)'s requirements 
exclusive in a suit against an alien would be to permit 
a foreign infringer, who conceivably could flood 
this country with merchandise known by it to infringe, to 
escape responsibility merely because it did not maintain 
a regular place of business here. Such a construction 
would work grave injustice in some cases by denying 
victims any relief at all, even under circumstances 
where fundamental fairness required the alien to subject 
himself to the jurisdiction as a condition to his doing 
business here." P 153. 
This was the status of the law when the instant case 
arrived at the CA9. There was language looking both ways 
in the Supreme Court (compare Hohorst against Stonite & Fourco) 
and there was a split in the lower courts created by the 
solo opinion in the CA7 case. The CA9 opted for the Phizer 
result in a short 2-page Per Curiam. The CA does not say 






I am in full accord with the CA9's choice. First, the 
Reviser's note is persuasive. It indicates that a different 
treatment was contemplated between 139l(c) and 139l(d)--i.e., 
domestic corporations were not to be as widely suable as were 
ali~. corporations in patent infringement suits. Second, the 
expansive language in Stonite and Fourco dealt only with 
domestic corporations. The problem in those cases was simply 
I \.\ 
one of determing ~here the patent infringement suit could be 
brought; it was never a question suit could be 
brought. This seems to me to be the critical point. In 
this regard the language in In re Hohorst is still quite 
persuasive. The object of the other venue provisions 
was to "distribute among the particular districts the general 
jurisdiction" granted to the federal courts. It was never 
contemplated that venue statutes themselves would eoafc~ ~ 
take away jurisdiction. This is especially true, as the 
Hohorst Court indicated, in patent infringement cases in which 
the federal is the only forum. It would require clear 
Congressional intent to believe that it intended to confer 
exclusive jurisdiction over a broad category of cases and 
then take it away altogether as to a segment of thos e 
tJ°_/d/"n/: ffJ 
d@i, ia~. The Reviser's Note indicates that no such 
harsh result was contemplated. 
Petr contends that the result is not so harsh even 
though the courthouses are closed to plaintiffs claiming that 
their patents have been infringed. They may (1) sue the 
s~llers of the infring ing product who have been licensed 
to distribute for the alien corporation, or (2) they may 





product out of the United States. Neither opportunity 
answers the basic point that the federal government has 
in essence created a right without a remedy directly against 
the wrongdoer, under Petr's reading of the statute. 
CONCLUSION 
Since logic and the sparse legislative history are both 
on the side of the Resp in this case, you should vote to 
affirm the CA9 and establish finally that the alien venue 






BRUNETTE MACHINE WURK:::i V. KUCK.UM lNlJU.:ST.Kill.::; .firgueu ~/ ~v/ ,~ 
No. 70-314 
J· ~ ~ \ 
~(~) 
~ L ~ ~ /4-z_ 
~Wvlt , S. ~HN..,,~~ 
/V~ ~~ 
~ 
Tk-u---u ) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
~~ ~~ ~~ ~ ~ -<; 
k, ,,,_..--k-u--t-~~ c,--,J2--,,_ , 
~ 'v M s ~ 4 ~ 
~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ -
~ Yvv>J-~ ~ ~ 
~~ '1--0 ~ ~ 
. 




llp/::S::S .1\,;\,; .J/G.J/ IG 
No. 70-314 BRUNETTE MACHINE WORKS V. KOCKUM INDUSTRIES 
Argued 3/23/72 
Tentative Impressions* 
Counsel for Brunette conceded that his client cannot be sued in 
the United states if the special venue statute with respect to patent 
cases is applicable. That statute - 28 U.S. C. 1400(b) - provides as 
follows: 
"Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought 
in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or 
where the defendant has committed acts of infringement 
and has a regular and established place of business." 
Counsel for Brunette relies on three decisions of this Court 
(Stonite, Fourco and _____ ) which use rather expansive language 
in saying that 28 U.S. C. 1400(b) was designed as a special jurisdictional 
statute for patent litigation. But these cases did not involve amimt~ 
aliens, and there was no discussion of the general statute applicable 
to suits against aliens. 
The general statute 28 U.S. C. 139l(d) provides quite simply: 
"An alien may be sued in any district." 
*These impressions are dictated on the afternoon following argument 
to record my initial and tentative impressions. I will have read, 
in preparation for the arguments, the principal briefs, some of the 
cases and the bench memo. I hope to do further study before the 
Conference. My views are subject to change and to the discussion 




My Tentative Views: 
Congress surely did not intend that aliens could not be sued for 
patent infringement. The language in 139l(d) is explicit and adequate 
to include patent suits. There is nothing - referred to in the briefs or 
otherwise - to suggest that Congress intended aliens to be exempt from 
patent litigation, or that § 139l(d) was not intended to embrace patent 
litigation unless it is otherwise expressly authorized by some other 
statute. 
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JURISDICTIONAL I NOT 
CERT. STATEMENT MERITS MOTION AB- VOT-
SENT 
G D N POST DIS AFF REV AFF G D ING 
No. 70-314 
-
To: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
Mr . Justice Brennan 
Mr . Just i ce Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Just ice Blackmun 
Mr. Justice Powell 
/ Mr. Just ice Rehnquist 1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA'fflS Marshall, J. 
No. 70-314 
Ci rculated : MA't ~ lJ 1972 
Recirculated: ______ _ 
Brunette Machine Works,) On Writ of Certiorari to 
Ltd., Petitioner, the United States Court 
v. of Appeals for the Ninth 
Kockum Industries, Inc. Circuit. 
[May -, 1972] 
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Section 1391 (d) of the United States Judicial Code 
provides that "an alien may be sued in any district." 
Section 1400 (b) provides that "any civil action for 
patent infringement may be brought in the judicial 
district where the defendant resides, or where the de-
fendant has committed acts of infringement and has a 
regular and established place of business." We are 
asked to decide which provision governs the venue of 
an action for patent infringement a.gainst an alien 
defendant. 
Respondent Kockum, an Alabama corporation doing 
business in Oregon, holds a United States patent on a 
machine that removes bark from logs. Kockum claims 
that petitioner Brunette, a Canadian corporation, has 
infringed that patent by assisting two American manu-
facturers to make and sell similar machines.1 Kockum 
obtained service of process on Brunette in Oregon, under 
that State's long-arm statute, Ore. Rev. Stat. § 14.035, 
1 Respondent's suit against one of those manufacturers, an Oregon 
corporation, is now pending on appeal to the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit. Kockum Industries, Inc. v. Salem Equipment~ 




2 BRUNETTE MACHINE WKS. v. KOCKUM INDUSTRIES 
and filed this action for patent infringement in the 
United States District Court for Oregon. The District 
Court dismissed the complaint on the ground of im-
proper venue, accepting Brunette's contention that§ 1400 
(b) is the exclusive provision governing venue in patent 
infringement litigation, and that its requirements were 
not satisfied here.2 The Court of Appeals reversed, 
holding that § 1391 ( d) applies to patent infringement 
suits as to all others, and hence that Brunette is subject 
to suit as an alien in any district. - F. 2d - ( 1971). 
\Ve granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the Circuits 
on this question. 3 - U. S. - (1971). We affirm. 
I 
Section 1391 ( d) , providing that an alien may be sued 
in any district, appeared for the first time in the Judicial 
Code of 1948, but its roots go back to the beginning of 
the Republic. The first restrictions on venue in the fed-
eral courts were set forth in the Judiciary Act of 1789: 
"[N]o civil suit shall be brought before either [dis-
trict or circuit] courts against an inhabitant of the 
United States, by any original process in any other 
district than that ,Yhereof he is an inhabitant, or in 
2 Petitioner does not " reside" in Oregon , because the residence of 
a corporation for purposes of § 1400 (b) is its place of incorporation. 
F'ourco Glass Co. \". 'l'ransmirra Prods . Corp ., 3,53 U. 8. 222 (1957) . 
discussed post. And while the alleged infringement occurred in 
OrPgon, petitioner apparently has no rPgulnr plarC' ol' bu~inC'ss tlwre. 
3 Compare the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit below with Coulter Electronics, !11 c. v. A. B . Lars Ljungberg & 
Co., 376 F. 2d 743 (CA7), cert denied, 389 U.S. 859 (1967) . Several 
district courts in other circuits have adopted the Yie\\' taken by the 
Court of Appeals for the Kinth Circuit in thi~ ca~e . ~C'C' Chas. Pfizer 
& Co. v. Laboratori Pro-Ter Prodotti Therap eutici, 278 F. Supp. 
148 (SDNY 1967) ; Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. 111olins Or-
ganizations, Ltd., 261 F . Supp. 436 (ED Va. 1966). 
70-314-OPINION 
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which he shall be found at the time of serving the 
writ .... " 1 Stat. 73, 79 (1789). 4 
Because this limitation on the place where federal 
cases might be tried applied in terms only to suits 
against "an inhabitant of the United States," suits 
against aliens were left unrestricted, and could be tried 
in any district, subject only to the requirements of 
service of process. 
The original venue provisions remained essentially 
unchanged until 1875, when Congress substantially re-
vised the Judiciary Act and greatly expanded the scope 
of federal jurisdiction. 18 Stat. 470 (1875). 5 In de-
scribing the class of cases subject to venue restrictions. 
the 1875 statute dropped the phrase "suit ... against 
an inhabitant of the United States" and substituted 
"suit ... against any person." This Court held, how-
ever, that the change was stylistic and not substantive, 
and that Congress did not thereby bring suits against 
4 The prons1on for venue where,·er the defendant "shall be 
found" is decept ively broitd. The grnnt of federal jurisdiction at that 
time consisted almost cxrl11sively of suits between parties of diverse 
citizenship. Unlike the pre,:ent statute. howeHr. which proYides for 
,iurisdiction o\'er suits "between citizens of different States," 28 
U. S. C. § 1332 (a) (1) , the 1789 statute proYided for juri,;diction OYer 
suits "bet\1·een a citizen of the State whrre the suit is brought , and 
n citizen of another Stnte." Thus the litigants were effectively con-
fined to the district of res idence of one of them, by the jurisdictional 
grant though not by the Yenue statutes. This rest riction was elimi-
nated in 1875, when il number of importnnt changes were made in 
the Judiciary Act , see n. 5, infra, and the re!eYant clause of the 
grant of diversit~· jurisdict ion was rephrased in its present form, 18. 
Stat. 470 (1875). 
5 The jurisdiction of the Federal Courts was extended to include 
suits "arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States," 
i. e., the federal question jurisdiction now found in 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1331 (a ). And the diwrsity jurisdiction was rephrased, see n. 4, 
supra. 
70-314-OPINION 
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aliens within the scope of the venue laws. In re Hohorst, 
150 U. S. 653 (1893). 
The Court offered t,rn reasons in H ohorst for con-
cluding that suits against aliens remained outside the 
scope of the venue laws. First, no contemporary sig-
nificance appears to have attached to the relevant change 
in language in 1875.6 Second, and perhaps more im-
portant, to hold the venue statutes applicable to suits 
against aliens would be in effect to oust the federal 
courts of jurisdiction in most cases, because the general 
venue provisions were framed with reference to the de-
fendant's place of residence or citizenship, and an alien 
defendant is by definition a citizen of no district. 7 The 
H ohorst Court reasoned that it should not lightly be 
assumed that Congress intended that result, in light of 
the fact that the venue provisions are designed not to 
keep suits out of the federal courts, but merely to allo-
6 150 U. S., at 61, citing In re Louisville Underwriters, 134 U. S. 
488, 492 (1890); and Shall" Y . Quincy Mining Co., 145 U.S. 444. 448 
(1892), for the proposition that the substitution "has been asssumed 
to be an immateria l clrnnge." 
7 In 1875, the restrictions on venue in the federal courts were 
those imposed by the 1789 statute quoted in text: suit could be· 
brought where the defendant was an inhabitant , or where he could 
be found. In 1887, however, Congress eliminated the provision au-
thorizing suit wherever the defendant could be found: federal ques-
tion cases could be brought only where the defendant was an 
"inhabitant," and diversity cases only where either the plaintiff or 
the defendant resides. 24 Stat. 552 (1887). A suit against an 
alien was not regarded as a true diversity suit, and hence it was 
necessary to satisfy the requirements of federal question venue, 
i. e., residence of the defendant. Hohorst, supra. 
Today the general venue provisions for federal question and di-
yersity cases appear in 28 U.S. C. §§ 1391 (a) and (b); they follow 
the 1887 statute, except that Congress has added a provision for 
venue "where the claim arose," see n. 8, infra. 
70-314-OPINION 
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cate suits to the most appropriate or convenient federal 
forum. 8 
The reasoning of H ohorst with respect to suits against 
aliens continues to have force today. In remains true 
today that to hold the venue statutes applicable here 
would in effect oust the federal courts of a jurisdiction 
clearly conferred on them by Congress. Moreover, in 
the 99 years since H ohorst was decided, Congress has 
never given the slightest indication that it is dissatisfied 
with the long-standing judicial view that the 1789 lan-
guage continues to color the venue statutes, with the 
result that suits against aliens are outside the scope of 
all the venue laws. 
II 
Petitioner argues that by enacting § 1400 (b), Con-
gress indicated a legislative intent to reject that rule· 
in patent cases, and regulate the venue of suits against 
8 There have been, and perhaps there still are, occasional gaps 
in the venue laws, i. e., c2ses in which the federal courts have juris-
diction but there is no district in which venue is proper. One such 
gap arose in connection with cases involving mult iple plaintiffs and 
defendants. Venue was fixed at the residence of the defendant, or 
in diversit)· cases at the residence of the plaint iff as well. When 
there were mult iple plaintiffs or defendants, the district of residence--
for venue purposes was the district were all plaintiffs or all defend-
ants reside. Smith v. Lyon, 133 U. S. 315 (1890). If they resided 
in different districts then there was no proper venue. In 1966 Con-
gress acted to close the gap with a provision authorizing suit "where-
the claim arose," 80 Stat. 1111 (1966) , which in most cases provides 
a proper Yenue eYen in mult iple-party situations. The development 
supports the view that Congress does not in general intend to create 
Yenue gaps, which take away with one hand what Congress has given 
by way of jurisdictional grant with the other. Thus in construing 
venue statutes it is reasonable to prefer the construction that avoids 
leaving such a gap. 
70-314-0PINION 
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aliens in that limited class of cases. There is support for 
petitioner's argument in the broad langauge of prior de-
cisions of this Court. Twice before, the Court has refused 
to apply venue provisions of general applicability to pat-
ent infringement cases. In Stonite Prods. Co. v. Lloyd 
Co., the Court declared that what is now § 1400 (b) is 
"the exclusive provision controlling venue in patent in-
fringment proceedings." 315 U. S. 561, 563 (1942) . 
Stonite held that venue in patent cases is not affected by 
what is now § 1392 (a), which relaxes certain restrictive 
venue rules in cases involving multiple defendants.9 Sim-
ilarly, in Fourco Glass Co. Y. Transmirra Prods. Corp., the 
Court asserted that "28 U.S. C. § 1400 (b) is the sole and 
exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringe-
ment actions," emphasizing its character as "a special 
venue statute applicable. specifically, to all defendants 
in a particular type of action." 353 U. S. 222, 228-229 
(1957) (emphasis in original). Foitrco held that venue 
in patent cases is not affected by § 1391 ( c), which ex-
pands for venue purposes the definition of the residence 
of a corporation.10 
The analysis in each case rested heavily on the legis-
lative history of § 1400 (b). Prior to 1893, patent in-
fringement cases had been " ·idely, though not universally, 
regarded as subject to the general federal venue statutes. 
Chaffee Y. Hayward, 20 How. (61 U. S.) 208, 215-216· 
(1857) . This Court cast doubt on that proposition, how-
g Section 1392 (n) originall? 11 Stnt. 2i2 (1858), affords some-
relief in a wr~· small class of rnse~ that foll in the gap described 
in 11. 8. supra. When multiple defencbnts reside in different districts· 
within the same State, the suit mn~· be brought in nn~· one of them. 
10 Section 1391 ( c), enncted in 1948, proYides: A corporntion may 
be sued in any judicial dist ri('t in which it is incorporated or licensed 
to do business or is doing business. and such judicial dist rict shall 
be regarded as the residence of such corporation for nnue purposes. 
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ever, in the H ohorst case, supra. \Ve have already noted 
that Hohorst held the general venue limitations inappli-
cable because the defendant was an alien.11 In further 
support of the decision, however, the Court noted that the 
suit was based on a claim for patent infringement; the 
venue restrictions, said the Court, were intended to apply 
only to that part of the federal jurisdiction that was con-
current with state court jurisdiction, and not to patent 
suits. which are entrusted exclusively to the federal courts. 
The apparent effect of the decision was to hold that 
patent infringement suits could be tried in any district, 
even when the defendant was not an alien. After Ho-
horst, there ,ms great confusion on this point in the 
lower courts.1 2 Congress responded promptly, creating 
a special new venue statute for the occasion: patent 
infringement claims were to be heard only in the dis-
trict where the defendant was an inhabitant, or the 
district ,vhere he committed acts of infringement 
and also maintained a regular and established place 
of business. 29 Stat. 695 ( 1897) , now codified as 28 
U. S. C. § 1400 (b). The new provision ,ms of course 
more restrictive than the law as it was left by Hohorst, 
but it was rather less restrictive than the general 
venue provision then applicable to claims arising under 
federal law.1 3 Over the objections of some legislators, 
11 See pp. - - --, su7Jra. 
12 See Stonite Prods. Co. v. Lloyd Co .. 315 U. S. 561 , 564-565 
(19-12): conflicting decisions collected at 29 Coug. Rec. 1901 (.54th 
Cong. , 2d Sess., 1897) . 
13 Venue in a federt1 I question case wns at that time proper only 
where the defendaut was an inhabitant, 2-! Stat. 552 (1887) , :is cor-
rected 25 Stat. 433 (1888) . Thus the new statute gave patent cfaim-
ants an advantage by authorizing as an addi t ional wnue alternative 
any district where the defandant maintained a regular place of 
business, and committed acts of infringement. Ironically, changes 
in the general venue law han left the patent nnue statute far be-
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who could see no reason for treating patent suits dif-
ferently from any other federal question litigation,14 
Congress took the opportunity to establish for patent 
infringement suits a special and separate venue statute. 
Thus it is fair to say, as the Court did in Stonite and 
Fourco, that in 1897 Congress placed patent infringe-
ment cases in a class by themselves, outside the scope 
of general venue legislation. 
But that analysis sheds no light on the present case. 
For it totally misconceives the origin and purpose of 
§ 1391 ( d) to characterize that statute as an appendage-
to the general venue statutes, analogous to the pro-
visions at issue in Stonite and Fourco. Section 1391 ( d) 
is not derived from the general venue statutes that 
§ 1400 (b) was intended to replace. Section 1391 ( d) 
reflects, rather, the longstanding rule that suits against 
alien defendants are outside those statutes. Since the 
general venue statutes did not reach suits against alien 
defendants, there is no reason to suppose the new substi-
tute in patent cases was intended to do so. Indeed, t1ie 
only glimmer of evidence of legislative intent points in 
the other direction. We have no reliable indication of 
what Congress thought about the matter in 1875, when it 
dropped the language that expressly excluded suits against 
alien defendants from the general venue statutes, or in 
1897, when it enacted the special patent venue statute. 
But in 1948, Congress was apparently quite content to 
leave suits against alien defendants exempt from the 
hind. Since 1948, a corporate defendant has been subject to suit 
not only where he maintains a "regular place of business," as in 
§ 1400 (b), but also where he is "doing business." 62 Stat. 869, now 
§ 1391 (c). And since 1966, the general Yenue law has authorized 
suit "where the claim arose," see n. -, supra. 
14 See 29 Cong. Rec. 1901 (54th Cong., 2d Sess., 1897) (remarks 
of Mr. Payne). 
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venue statutes, in patent cases as in all others. In that 
year, Congress codified as § 1391 (d) the rule exempting-
suits against aliens from the federal venue statutes. The 
Revisers' Notes, whiclh provide the principal guide to in-
terpretation of the 1948 Code, explain the intent to codify 
a rule that commands the ''vveight of authority," citing a 
pair of district court cases. These cases hold that neither-
the general venue laws nor the patent venue law controls. 
in a suit against an alien defendant. Sandusky Foundry 
& Machine Co. v. DeLavaud, 251 Fed. 631 (ND Ohio 
1918); Keating v. Pennsylvania Co., 245 Fed. 155 (ND 
Ohio 1917). 
III 
We conclude that in § 1391 (d) Congress was stating a 
principle of broad and overriding application, and not 
merely making an adjustment in the general venue stat-
ute, as this Court found Congress had done in Stonite 
and Fourco. The principle of § 1391 (d) cannot be con-
fined in its application to cases that would otherwise fall 
under the general venue statutes. For § 1391 (d) is. 
properly regarded, not as a venue restriction at all, but 
rather as a declaration of the long-established rule that 
suits against aliens are wholly outside the operation of 
all the federal venue laws, general and special. 
That rule, which has prevailed throughout the history 
of the federal courts, controls this case. Since respondent 
Brunette is an alien corporation, it cannot rely on § 1400 
(b) as a shield agai11st suit in the District of Oregon .. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed._ 
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